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COMES NOW Respondent, Meridian Police Department, and submits the following 
Brief in response to Appellants' Brief: 
ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Court upon a Verified Petition to Compel Disclosure of Public 
Records ("Petition") filed by Gretchen Hymas, Breanna Halowell, and Travis Forbush 
("Appellants") on December 26,2012. Though the Petition was rendered moot by the Meridian 
Police Department ("MPD")'s provision of the requested records to Appellants on February 25, 
2013, Appellants argue that they are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 9-344(2). The 
District Court found that Appellants were not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 9-
344(2), because Appellants were not the prevailing party. The District Court further found that 
MPD's initial denial of Appellants' request was not frivolously pursued. As these findings 
evince a sound exercise of discretion, this Court should uphold the decision of the District Court. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On November 10,2012, MPD Detective James Miller initiated an investigation of the 
cause of death of Private First Class McQuen Forbush. R. p. 22. On December 6, 2012, counsel 
for Petitioners filed a public records request with the Meridian Police Department, requesting 
"all information and documents relating or pertaining to the investigation into McQuen's death." 
R. p. 8. On December 21, 2012, the City sent Mr. Clark a letter denying his request (R. p. 9), 
citing Idaho Code § 9-335(1)(a), due to the ongoing nature of the law enforcement investigation 
into the circumstances ofPfc. Forbush's death. Idaho Code § 9-335(1)(a) reads, in relevant part: 
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Notwithstanding any statute or rule of court to the contrary, nothing in this 
chapter . . . shall be construed to require disclosure of investigatory records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes by a law enforcement agency, but such 
exemption from disclosure applies only to the extent that the production of such 
records would: ... Interfere with enforcement proceedings[.] 
On December 26, 2012, Mr. Clark filed a Verified Petition to Compel Disclosure of Public 
Records. R. p. 4. 
Mr. Clark filed seven additional public records requests with the City of Meridian (R. p. 
12), including a On December 28,2012 verbal request for records containing the make, model, 
and serial number of the water heater located in the Sagecrest Apartment occupied by Pfc. 
Forbush at the time of his death. R. p. 393. This request was granted by response dated 
December 31, 2012. ld. 
Det. Miller concluded his investigation on February 21, 2013 (R. p. 23), and MPD 
provided "all information and documents relating or pertaining to the investigation into 
McQuen's death," with some information redacted pursuant to statute, to Mr. Clark on February 
25,2013 (R. p. 26). The District Court heard oral argument and testimony on the matter on 
February 27,2013 and entered an Order Denying Motionfor Attorney's Fees and Costs on 
March 15,2013. R. p. 374. 
The District Court found, inter alia, that Appellants were not the prevailing party (R. p. 
378), and that MPD was not frivolous in its denial of the investigatory record while the 
investigation was ongoing (R. p. 380). For these reasons, the District Court determined that 
Appellants were not entitled to attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code § 9-344(2), which 
reads, in relevant part: "In any such action, the court shall award reasonable costs and attorney 
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fees to the prevailing party or parties, if it finds that the request or refusal to provide records was 
frivolously pursued." R. p. 380. 
Appellants filed Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration on March 20, 2013 (R. p. 382); 
MPD opposed the motion. The District Court entered an Order Denying Petitioners' Motionfor 
Reconsideration on May 14, 2013. 1 In this order, the Court again found that Appellants were not 
the prevailing party (May 14, 2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, pp. 
4,6), and that MPD did not act in bad faith in its denial of the investigatory record while the 
investigation was ongoing (Id., p. 5). The Court entered a judgment on May 14,2013. R. p. 402. 
Appellants filed the instant appeal on June 25, 2013. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal are as follows: 
A. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter on appeal. 
B. Whether it was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to find that Appellants were 
not entitled to attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 9-344(2). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court exercises free review over questions regarding the interpretation of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Boise }.{ode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 
103 (2013). The decision regarding an award of attorney's fees and costs is within the discretion 
of the trial court; the standard of review is whether the District Court abused its discretion. 
1 The District Court's May 14, 2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration is included in the 
record pursuant to the Court's December 16,2013 Order Granting Appellants' Second Motion to Augment the 
Record. 
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Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 643 (2006). Likewise, the determination of 
which party is the prevailing party is within the discretion of the trial court, and may not be 
disturbed absent abuse of discretion. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 797 (2002); Bouten 
Construction Co. v. HF. "tfagnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 767 (1999). 
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion, this Court must examine: 
(1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial 
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87, 94 (1991). The burden is on the Appellants to show that the District Court abused its 
discretion. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Federal Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 
525 (2001). 
ARGUMENT 
A. This Court does not have jurisdiction over this matter, because this appeal was not 
timely filed. 
As set forth above, on March 15,2013, the District Court entered an Order Denying 
Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. R. p. 374. The March 15, 2013 Order Denying Motion 
for Attorney's Fees and Costs was a final judgment, because it resolved all of the issues before 
the District Court, fully adjudicated the subject matter of the controversy before the District 
Court, and embodied a final determination of the rights of the parties. See Camp v. East Fork 
Ditch Co., 137 Idaho 850, 867 (2002). 
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The District Court, however, in its May 14,2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion/or 
Reconsideration found that its March 15,2013 Order Denying Motion/or Attorney's Fees and 
Costs was not final, but interlocutory in nature, as it was temporary, did not completely 
adjudicate the dispute, and was not effectuated by a separate judgment. May 14, 2013 Order 
Denying Petitioners' lvfotion/or Reconsideration, p. 3. These findings were in error, and it was 
on the basis of these erroneous findings that the District Court considered Appellants' March 20, 
2013 Motion/or Reconsideration under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure ("I.R.C.P.") II(a)(2)(B), 
a decision that was therefore also in error. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for a general motion for 
reconsideration. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Rybar, III Idaho 396, 397 (1986). Validity may be 
imputed to an improperly brought motion to reconsider only where such motion "is the 
equivalent of one of the existing post-trial motions within the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and not as a separate motion per se." First Bank & Trust 0/ Idaho v. Parker Brothers, Inc., 112 
Idaho 30, 31 (1986). To determine whether a motion to reconsider a final judgment may be 
properly recast as a different post-trial motion, such motion "must be identified as asserting one 
of the grounds for relief recognized in one of our existing rules"- the most common being 
I.R.C.P. 59(a), 59(e), or 60(b). Id. at 32. 
The District Court, however, reconsidered the petition without first finding that 
Petitioners' motion was in substance a motion for a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a), a motion 
to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59( e), or a motion for relief from the order 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b). I.R.C.P. II(a)(2)(B) conveys authority for a court to reconsider and 
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vacate only an interlocutory order, not a final order like the March 15, 2013 Order Denying 
Motionfor Attorney's Fees and Costs. Dunlap et al. v. Cassia ivfemorial Hospital and Medical 
Center, 134 Idaho 233, 236 (2000). 
For these reasons, the District Court's re-adjudication of the merits of the parties' 
arguments pursuant to Appellants' March 20, 2013 Motionfor Reconsideration was improper, 
and the May 14, 2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was entered in 
error. The forty-two day period to file a notice of appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule ("LA.R.") 
14( a) therefore began to run upon the District Court's entry of the March 15, 2013 Order. 
Goodman Oil v. Scotty's Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 591 (2010). That it was 
entitled "order," and not "judgment," is of no consequence. Id. 
The time for Appellants to appeal the March 15,2013 Order expired on April 29, 2013. 
Appellants filed the instant appeal on June 25, 2013. Pursuant to tAR. 21, failure to timely 
appeal is jurisdictional, requiring dismissal. State v. Ward, 150 Idaho 446, 447 (CL App. 2010). 
Lacking jurisdiction over this matter, this Court must dismiss this appeal. 
B . Appellants were not entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 9-344(2). 
If, alternatively, the Court finds that it does have jurisdiction over this matter, it should 
uphold the District Court's determination that Appellants were not entitled to attorney fees under 
Idaho Code § 9-344(2). That provision states, in relevant part, that the District Court "shall 
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award reasonable costs and attorney fees to the prevailing party or parties, if it finds that the 
request or refusal to provide records was frivolously pursued.,,2 
1. Appellants were not the prevailing party. 
The law enforcement investigation ofPfc. Forbush's death concluded on February 21, 
2013 (R. p. 23), and the requested records, with some statutorily exempt information redacted,3 
was provided to Mr. Clark two business days later, on February 25,2013 (R. p. 26). The District 
Court properly found that neither Appellants nor MPD could be the prevailing party in the case 
below, as MPD's provision of the relief sought in Appellants' underlying petition rendered it 
moot. R. p. 378,380; May 14,2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion/or Reconsideration, pp. 
4-6; October 29,2013 Order Clarifying Record on Appeal,4 pp. 2. There can be no prevailing 
party in a nonjusticiable case. 5 
An identical factual situation occurred in Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792 (2002) 
("Bolger"). In Bolger, three days before the show cause hearing in that case, the Attorney 
General's Office disclosed to Mr. Bolger documents that it had previously withheld pursuant to 
2 Idaho Code § 9-335(4) contains a similar provision, which states, in relevant part: "The court may, in its discretion, 
award costs and fees to the prevailing party." Appellants have not argued that they are entitled to attorney fees 
under Idaho Code § 9-335(4), but under Idaho Code § 9-344(2). 
3 Appellants do not contest the propriety of the redactions, only the timing of the release of the records provided. 
4 The District Court's October 29, 2013 Order ClarifYing Record on Appeal is included in the record pursuant to the 
Court's December 3,2013 Order Granting Appellants' Motion to Augment the Record. 
5 In the District Court's May 14, 2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Moody posits 
that "The fact that the motion to compel was mooted by the disclosure of records is not dispositive on the prevailing 
party question" (May 14, 2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration, p. 5) and to prove this point 
describes a hypothetical situation containing an exception to the mootness doctrine ("capable of repetition, yet 
evading review"), wherein the challenged conduct is of such a limited duration as to prohibit full litigation prior to 
termination of the conduct. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Mallery v. Lewis, 106 Idaho 
227,234,678 P.2d 19,26 (1983). This exception applies where the conduct's short duration precludes judicial 
review of a live controversy, but the conduct reasonably could be expected to be imposed repeatedly upon the same 
or similarly situated complainants; it is used to make an otherwise moot case justiciable. But the exception cannot 
be used to prove the rule: There can be no prevailing party in a nonjusticiable case. 
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Idaho Code § 9-335(l)(a) due to an ongoing law enforcement investigation conducted by that 
agency. The district court in that case determined that Mr. Bolger was not the prevailing party. 
Upon review, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court's determination, stating that "the 
'determination of who is a prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court 
and will not be disturbed absent abuse of discretion. '" Bolger, 137 Idaho at 797, quoting Bouten 
Constr. Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho at 767. 
Likewise, in the case at bar, the District Court exercised its discretion appropriately, 
meeting all three prongs of the test articulated in Sun Valley Shopping Center v. Idaho Power 
Co., 119 Idaho at 94 ("Sun Valley"). The District Court met the first prong because it correctly 
perceived the issue of prevailing party as one over which the District Court had discretion. See, 
e.g., R. p. 378; May 14,2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motionfor Reconsideration, p. 5. The 
District Court also met the second prong by acting within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standards and precedent articulated in Bolger. Appellants argue 
that Judge Moody's determination that she did not need to review the contents of the responsive 
public records in camera demonstrates an abuse of discretion, i.e., that the District Court failed 
the second prong of the Sun Valley test. This is not accurate, for three reasons. 
First, the content of the public records responsive to Appellants' underlying petition has 
never been at issue in the case. Appellants contested neither the completeness of the record 
provided, nor the appropriateness of the redactions to the record provided. Instead, Appellants 
took issue with the timing and methodology of the disclosure; they argued that they were entitled 
to disclosure of the records requested, or some portion thereof, upon request, notwithstanding the 
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pendency of the law enforcement investigation. The District Court, also correctly perceiving the 
issue to be one of timing, examined the affidavits and testimony regarding the chronology of the 
law enforcement investigation and the request, and appropriately determined that the active 
nature of the investigation at the time rendered the investigatory records exempt from disclosure, 
regardless of their content. R. p. 379; May 14,2013 Order Denying Petitioners' Motion/or 
Reconsideration, p. 5. 
Second, there are two statutes that establish the procedure by which a district court is to 
analyze a petition contesting an agency's decision to withhold public records pursuant to 
statutory exemption. Idaho Code § 9-335(4) says, in relevant part, "The court shall decide the 
case after examining the record in camera, papers filed by the parties, and such oral argument 
and additional evidence as the court may allow." (Emphasis added.) Idaho Code § 9-344(1) 
states, in relevant part: "The court shall decide the case after examining the pleadings filed by the 
parties and such oral arguments and additional evidence as the court may allow. The court may 
examine the record in camera in its discretion." (Emphasis added.) Though these provisions do 
authorize the reviewing district court to examine the record, neither of these provisions requires 
the district court to do so. That the District Court declined to do so in the case at bar does not 
evince an abuse of discretion. 
Third, as set forth above, MPD's provision of the record to Appellants rendered moot the 
question of the propriety ofMPD's withholding such records. Once the records were disclosed, 
the District Court had no further need or obligation to examine the records and determine 
whether MPD should disclose them. 
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For these reasons, the District Court met the second prong of the Sun Valley test, in that it 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion. The final prong was also met: The District 
Court reached its decision by an exercise of reason, as is clear from the analyses set forth in the 
March 15, 2013 Order Denying Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. pp. 374-380); the May 
14, 2013 Order Denying Petitioners' ]I.1otion for Reconsideration; and the October 29, 2013 
Order ClarifYing Record on Appeal. Appellants have not borne their burden to demonstrate that 
the District Court abused its discretion in finding that Appellants were not the prevailing party in 
the case below. 
2. It was not frivolous for MPD to deny a request for records of an active, 
ongoing law enforcement investigation. 
Even if, notwithstanding the petition's nonjusticiability, there can be a prevailing party in 
the case below, under Idaho Code § 9-344(2), there must also be a finding that MPD was 
frivolous in its decision not to grant Appellants' request. The District Court did not make such a 
finding, but did advanced extensive dicta on the question, and Appellants argue the point in their 
brief. 
MPD was not frivolous in its decision to deny, on December 21, 2012 Appellants' 
request for "all information and documents relating or pertaining to the investigation into 
McQuen's death," because the investigation was ongoing, and disclosure of the responsive 
records to the public would have interfered with the investigation. The information MPD 
withheld in this case was expressly, statutorily exempt from disclosure under Idaho Code § 9-
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335(1 )(a), and for this reason MPD was justified, and in no way frivolous, in withholding the 
records requested by Petitioners. 
a. MPD's action was not frivolous because law enforcement proceedings 
were pending and release of the requested information would cause 
articulable harm. 
Idaho Code § 9-335(1 )(a) is nearly identical to an exemption set forth in the federal 
Freedom ofInformation Act, specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) ("FOIA Exemption 7(A),,), 
which reads: "This § does not apply to ... records or information compiled for law enforcement 
purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or 
information could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings." (Idaho 
Code § 9-335(1)(a) was adopted in 1986; at the time the statutes were identical, though shortly 
thereafter Congress substituted "could reasonably be expected to" for "would" in FOIA 
Exemption 7(A).) "The general rule with relation to the construction of a statute adopted from 
another jurisdiction, including a federal statute adopted by a state, is that it will be presumed to 
have been adopted with the construction placed upon it by the courts of that state or country 
before its adoption." See, e.g, Girardv. Defenbach, 61 Idaho 702, 710 (1940). 
In its analysis of FOIA Exemption 7(A), the court in Wichlacz v. Us. Dept. of Interior, 
938 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. Va. 1996) ("Wichlacz") held that in order to satisfy the exemption's 
requirement that disclosure of the requested documents could reasonably be expected to interfere 
with law enforcement proceedings, the agency seeking the exemption must demonstrate: 1) that 
law enforcement proceedings were pending or prospective, and 2) that release of the information 
could reasonably be expected to cause some articulable harm. Though Wichlacz is not binding 
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on this Court, it provides persuasive authority and a framework with which this Court may 
analyze MPD's application ofIdaho Code § 9-335(1 )(a) to Appellants' public records request on 
December 21,2012. 
Here, both prongs of the Wichlacz test are met. It is undisputed that on December 21, 
2012, MPD's law enforcement investigation was pending, that the case was open and Detective 
Miller was actively investigating the circumstances ofPfc. Forbush's death. Further, it would 
have caused articulable harm for MPD to publicly release, at that point, "all information and 
documents relating or pertaining to the investigation into McQuen's death." Specifically, at the 
February 27, 2013 hearing, Detective Miller was asked how the disclosure of such records during 
the pendency of the investigation would interfere with law enforcement proceedings. He 
testified: "Well, there would have been information in the report that we received, callers 
wanting to speak to us and not having had a chance to speak to them before that, I think would 
have potentially been a problem with the investigation." Tr. p. 24, L. 2-6, Show Cause Hearing, 
(February 27,2013). 
Prosecutor Terry Derden also testified that the disclosure of investigatory records during 
the active investigation can provide persons involved in the commission of a crime with an 
opportunity to concoct an alibi, hide or destroy evidence, thwart the investigation, or evade 
contact by the police. Id., pp. 45-48. 
The federal jurisprudence explaining the purpose ofFOIA Exemption 7(A) is replete with 
examples of the harm that is avoided by enabling law enforcement agencies to refuse to publicly 
disclose investigatory records prepared by law enforcement agencies that would interfere with 
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enforcement proceedings. Nondisclosure of investigatory records of law enforcement agencies 
has been upheld where disclosure could: highlight areas of investigative concern or alert 
potential suspects as to the existence of the investigation (Lynch v. Department of Treasury, 210 
F.3d 384 (9th Cir. 2000»); create risk of intimidation to those who provided statements to the 
investigating officer (Pototsky v. Department of the Navy, 695 F. Supp. 1084 (D. Haw. 1988)); 
aid a subject of the investigation in altering or destroying evidence or coercing witnesses (ABC 
Home Health Services, Inc. v. Us. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 548 F. Supp. 555 (N.D. 
Ga. 1982); assist investigated subjects in altering or tailoring their testimony (Wichlacz, 938 F. 
Supp. at 325); reveal priority or scope of investigations (Nunez v. Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Us. Dept. of Justice, 497 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. N.Y. 1980)); be used to establish 
fraudulent alibis (Donovan v. F.B.I., 579 F. Supp. 1111 (S.D. N.Y. 1983)); and reveal where 
investigative resources are focused (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Us. 
Department of Homeland Security, 516 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D.D.C. 2007)). 
Here, MPD was not frivolous in its application ofIdaho Code § 9-335(1 )(a) to 
Appellants' request for "all information and documents relating or pertaining to the 
investigation" while the investigation itself was ongoing. Disclosure of the documents requested 
by Appellants at the time they were requested could reasonably have been expected to cause 
articulable harm to, and certainly interference with, a thorough and fair investigation ofPfc. 
Forbush's death. 
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b. MPD appropriately considered context and timing in applying Idaho 
Code § 9-335(1)(a) to Appellants' request. 
Idaho Code § 9-341 says: 
If any public record contains material which is not exempt from disclosure as well 
as material which is exempt from disclosure, the public agency or independent 
public body corporate and politic shall, upon receipt of a request for disclosure, 
separate the exempt and nonexempt material and make the nonexempt material 
available for examination, provided that a denial of a request to copy nonexempt 
material in a public record shall not be based upon the fact that such nonexempt 
material is contained in the same public record as the exempt material. 
Appellants argue that this provision required MPD to, on December 21, 2012, while in 
the course of the law enforcement investigation, review each document contained in Detective 
Miller's investigatory file, and determine whether disclosure of each particular document alone 
would interfere with the ongoing law enforcement investigation. To impose this requirement in 
the context of an open, active law enforcement investigation would be to circumvent the 
purposes of the exemption set forth in Idaho Code § 9-335(1)(a). The same documents which, in 
their original context, are without consequence or significance, when contained within law 
enforcement investigatory records, are laden with meaning that could threaten public safety and 
cause irreversible damage to the investigation. 
The relationship ofIdaho Code § 9-341 to Idaho Code § 9-335(1)(a) is a matter of first 
impression. Respondent's position is that the duty of the custodian of the requested record under 
Idaho Code § 9-341, though not abrogated by Idaho Code § 9-335(1 )(a), is necessarily tempered 
by a consideration of the enumerated harms to be prevented by the application of Idaho Code § 
9-335(1)(a). To the extent there is any real or perceived conflict between these two sections, 
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Idaho Code § 9-335(1)(a) must controL Where public records that might otherwise be subject to 
disclosure under another provision of the Idaho Public Records Act are investigatory records 
compiled for law enforcement purposes by a law enforcement agency, and the disclosure of that 
record will cause one of the harms enumerated in Idaho Code § 9-338(1 ) (a-f) , such records must 
be exempt from disclosure in order to avoid such harm. 
This Court has addressed the relationship between Idaho Code §§ 9-342 (authorizing a 
person's access to otherwise exempt records that are about such person) and 9-335, and held that 
where Section 9-342 could be used to circumvent Section 9-335, the latter would control: 
"Section 9-335, Idaho Code, controls over provisions ... that might otherwise provide for 
disclosure of investigatory records." Gibson v. Ada County, 138 Idaho 787, 790 (2003). There, 
as here, an otherwise unqualified statutory right to access a public record was appropriately 
limited by the context and timing within which such record was requested. 
The applicability ofIdaho Code § 9-335(1)(a) to investigatory records is a matter of 
timing as well as context. The degree to which disclosing particular documents to the public will 
compromise the viability of an investigation necessarily changes throughout the course of a 
pending law enforcement investigation, as leads are pursued and abandoned, as persons of 
interest are identified and interviewed, and as documents or clues are located and examined. 
Pursuant to its authority under Idaho Code § 9-335(1)(a), MPD appropriately considered 
both the context and the timing of the record sought by Appellants on December 6, 2013, and 
appropriately withheld such record until the conclusion of the law enforcement investigation on 
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1, " .J. was not 
to fees under Idaho Code § 9-344(2). 
reason, L '!J!J'""HU1.h) are not 
C. Appellants are not entitled to attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code § 12-
117; Respondent is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
Respondent did not bring, pursue, or defend this matter frivolously, unreasonably or 
foundation, and Appellants have failed to show otherwise. Conversely, Appellants' 
appeal is frivolous and without legal or factual foundation, and for these reasons MPD should be 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117 and 54(e)(1). 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent "-"'c',..."'''++, to 
meet burden to the finding that 
I-iIJ,.l",au;) were not to 
under § 9-344(2). should 
to MPD on appeal. 
day of February, 2014. 
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